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Abstract
If there is one thing American criminal law scholars agree on, it is that our justice
system suffers from overcriminalization. Our codes criminalize too much conduct;
outdated offenses remain too long on the books, and legislatures cannot resist adding
new crimes and harsher punishments. This is so because criminal law is a distinctive
issue for legislative debate and for democratic politics generally. Few lobby against
crime creation; legislators respond to strong majoritarian preferences that make votes
against crime creation—or votes to repeal antiquated crimes—politically implausible.
Thus criminal law is “one-way ratchet”: it expands but doesn’t contract. On this
account, criminal law is a challenge for democratic governance, because criminal law is
the product of structural failures in political processes.
Yet this story fails to account for much of American criminal law policy and
practice. In fact, legislatures decline to enact bills proposing new crimes or increased
punishments every year. They repeal longstanding criminal statutes and reduce
punishments. Interest groups and popular opinion often support and sometimes drive
these reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of everincreasing harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that
sentiment. Legislatures criminalize very little conduct that most people think should be
completely unregulated, and unpopular or silly offenses left on the books are routinely
nullified by democratically accountable prosecutors or narrowed by courts. As a result,
criminal law’s reach into most citizens’ lives is almost surely less in most respects than in
the past.
More than ninety percent of criminal law enforcement is state rather than federal,
and state criminal justice systems on the whole more democratically responsive than the
federal system. Many state legislatures recently have proven better at devising
procedural frameworks to harness expertise in the reform of criminal law and
punishment policy and to moderate risks of dysfunctional policymaking. Coupled with
restraints from other branches, substantive overcriminalization, judged against a
baseline of democratic preferences, is a modest problem in the states. And what
overcriminalization exists has little effect on criminal justice’s well recognized problems
such as excessive plea bargaining, racial disparities, and high incarceration rates.
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Rethinking Overcriminalization
If there is one thing American criminal law scholars agree on, it is that our justice
system suffers from overcriminalization. Our codes criminalize too much conduct;
outdated offenses remain too long on the books, and legislatures cannot resist adding new
crimes and harsher punishments. There is also broad agreement on the reasons for this
pattern. Criminal law is a distinctive issue for legislative debate and for democratic
politics more generally. New offenses are cost-free, and few plausible groups lobby
against crime creation; legislators respond to strong majoritarian preferences that make
votes against crime creation and punishment increases—or votes to repeal antiquated
crimes—politically implausible. Thus criminal law, in the recurrent metaphor, is “oneway ratchet”: it expands but doesn’t contract. As a consequence we are moving “ever
closer to a world in which the law on the books makes everyone a felon.”1 This story
poses a challenge to democratic governance, because it suggests that criminal law is the
product of structural failures in political processes. Legislative processes not only cannot
cool the passions of the electorate in the service of rational social policy,2 they may
exaggerate those passions. A considerable body of prominent criminal law scholarship in
the last decade has either focused on this problem or taken it for granted and explored its
causes and implications.3

1

William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001), quoted
in Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56
Hastings L.J. 633, 638 (2005) (hereafter Degradation), and in Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law
Important?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 261, 267-68 (2003) (suggesting “[t]his allegation may be understated”),
and in Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 32 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, 769 (2004) (hereinafter Crimes).
2
See, e.g., Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 83 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
3
See Symposium: Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 541 (2005) (articles by
Ellen S. Podgor, John S. Baker, John Hasnas, Peter J. Henning, Erik Luna, Sara Sun Beale, Geraldine Szott
Moohr and Paul Rosenzweig); Donald Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1155 (2005); Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1;
Douglas Husak, Crimes, supra note 1, at 769; Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost
Everything (Gene Healy ed. 2004); Stuntz, supra note 1; Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1; Paul
Rosenzweig, The Overcriminalization of Social and Economic Conduct (Heritage Foundation Legal
Memorandum 2003); John S. Baker, Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Criminal Legislation
(2004) (report sponsored by Federalist Society) available at www.fed-soc.org; Am. Bar Ass’n, The
Federalization of Criminal Law 7-11 (1997) (concluding that more than 40% of federal criminal statutes
were enacted in the last thirty years) ; Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997); David A.J.
Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization (1982) .
This complaint has some history. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374
Annals Am Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 157 (1967).
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This story contains some truth, but it also fails to account for much of American
criminal law policy and practice. In fact, legislatures decline to enact bills proposing new
crimes or increased punishments every year, for reasons familiar to students of legislative
process. Legislators sometimes repeal longstanding criminal statutes, reduce
punishments, reduce offense severity, and occasionally convert crimes to civil
infractions. Moreover, interest groups and popular opinion often support and sometimes
drive these reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of
ever-increasing harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that
sentiment—even when, as in the case of consensual sex crimes, popular sentiment is not
uniform. Legislatures criminalize very little conduct that most people think should be
completely unregulated, and they sometimes reduce punishments for widely endorsed
offenses. And what offenses legislatures leave on the books, democratically accountable
prosecutors often nullify in practice: many of the crimes scholars complain about are
rarely prosecuted.
Part I of the article unpacks the overcriminalization literature to identify several
distinct complaints—duplicate offenses, prohibition of trivial or innocuous conduct,
federalization of state crime, and the related problem of excessive punishment. Despite
these facts, however, there is little criminalization of wholly innocent conduct, save for
(a) trivial offenses that are almost never enforced and (b) pockets of federal practice.
Further, criminal law’s substantive scope is almost surely narrower in most respects than
in the past, at least in its effect on most citizens. Part II maps the biggest reasons for this:
legislatures have long histories and continuing practices of abolishing crimes, narrowing
offense definitions and moderating punishments that contrast with their creation of new
offenses and harsher sanctions. Legislators also routinely decline proposals for new
crimes or greater punishments; in criminal law as in other policy areas, most bills fail.
On this account, criminal law is not a one-way ratchet of ever-increasing severity driven
by law-and-order politics or flawed democratic institutions. It looks instead more like
other policy debates that often have high public salience—tax policy, for example—but
on which public and interest-group pressures occasionally shift and legislators have
multiple means of response or avoidance.
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Documenting this pattern generates a revised account of how well democratic
processes structure and execute criminal law, and it brings to light an important
distinction. State legislatures are, on the whole, better at criminal law than Congress.
And state prosecutors are much more politically accountable than their federal
counterparts. Those facts make state criminal justice systems on the whole more
democratically responsive than the federal system. That matters because more than
ninety percent of criminal law enforcement is state rather than federal.4
Overcriminalization concerns focused on federal law paint a misleading picture: the
problem in worse in the federal realm than in most states. Part III draws on legislation
scholarship to explain why. State legislatures operate under very different procedures
and norms than Congress, and recently many have proven better at devising procedural
frameworks to harness expertise in the reform of criminal law and punishment policy.
All policymaking faces familiar risks of translating public preferences into policy, of
majorities trampling minority interests, and of concentrated interests that succeed over
broad, diffuse interests. But in many state legislatures, procedural frameworks—
analogous to those Congress devised for a range of issues but never for substantive
criminal law reform5—moderate the greatest risks of dysfunctional criminal
policymaking. Part IV extends the picture of criminal law’s democratic structure. Direct
election of most state prosecutors additionally checks criminal law’s reach: even statutes
that legislatures ill-advisedly pass (or fail to repeal once antiquated) are functionally
nullified by local prosecutors whose priorities are governed by local politics and tight
budgets. Courts supplement this constraint, especially in the area of speech and
expressive-conduct crimes. These constraints explain why substantive
overcriminalization is a modest problem in the states, and why it is a bigger problem in a
small subset of federal criminal law.
4

Less than 5 percent of all prosecutions are federal and less than 10 percent of all inmates are in federal
prisons or jails. In 2003, the federal prisons and jails held 165,800 inmates, while state prisons and jails
held 1,912,800. On those numbers, federal prisoners account for about 8 percent of the nation’s inmates in
2003. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook for Criminal Justice Statistics—2003,
at tbl. 6.2. As for prosecutions, there were 66,452 federal criminal cases filed in 2002, while there were
1,051,000 felony convictions in state courts the same year; federal cases equal 6.3 of that state figure, which
excludes misdemeanors and felony charges not yielding conviction. Id. at tbls. 5.10 & 5.44.
5
An arguable exception is the unsuccessful National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
(a.k.a. the Brown Commission), which issued its report on overhauling the federal code in 1971 to no
effect.
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The upshot of this account is, first, that it is not clear there is much
overcriminalization at all. Overcriminalization is a normative judgment, and the baseline
for judgments about excessive offense definitions and sentencing levels, I argue, should
be democratic preferences. Judged by that standard, the patterns of substantive criminal
law contraction and expansion in recent decades reflect a plausible set of preferences we
could roughly describe as favoring expanded personal freedom combined with harsher
sanctions for harmful or risky conduct. America’s singularly severe punishment policies
can be criticized on many grounds but on the whole accord roughly with majoritarian
preferences, qualified by the recognition that preferences are dependent on imperfect
information and the cognitive frames of prevailing practices, and that particular
applications may be outside those preferences.6 Second, democratic governance works
surprisingly well in many respects for defining criminal law, roughly as well as it does
for most other areas of social policy. Finally, and as discussed in the concluding Part,
what overcriminalization exists has relatively little to do with many of criminal justice’s
most pressing problems, such as excessive plea bargaining, racial disparities, and high
incarceration rates.
I. Criminalization Complaints
Criticisms of overcriminalization capture several distinct complaints about the
general growth of substantive criminal law. One is simply that codes have grown.
Studies of the federal code document its dramatic growth in the last four decades,7 and
nearly every state code has expanded as well. As a rough measure of representative
growth in state codes, Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill note that the Illinois Code went
from less than 24,000 words in 1961 to 136,000 in 2003—a six-fold increase.8 Bill
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For insightful, contrasting accounts of American cultural preferences for harsh sanctions, see James Q.
Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe
(2003); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001).
For evidence and arguments that some sentencing policies depart from majoritarian preferences, see, e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame (presenting empirical data on public views
of appropriate sentencing levels); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You are Out, but
Why? The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 L. & Society Rev. 237 (1997);
Stuntz, supra note 1, at 549 & 595.
7
See Baker, supra note 3; Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 3.
8
Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from
Themselves?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 169, 172 & n.16 (2003).
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Stuntz found that, over the past 150 years, Virginia’s code grew from 170 to 495
offenses, and Massachusetts’ from 214 to 535.9
Those numbers are suggestive but tell us little about the merits of that expansion.
Some may be good; circumstances change, and law must adjust—we had little need for
computer crimes forty years ago. Scholars mainly stress two detrimental types of
criminal law growth. One is redundancy—multiple statutes that criminalize the same
conduct in slightly different or more specific ways, often with varying punishments.
Specific statutes within a jurisdiction are often redundant of moral general ones, and
much federal law is redundant of state offenses (over-federalization). The federal
carjacking statute is a frequently cited example,10 though scholars have cited many
others—offenses of damaging specific kinds of property that duplicate a general
property-damage statute,11 specific theft offenses that duplicate a general theft
definition,12 and perhaps hundreds of federal fraud and false-statement offenses.13
Other overcriminalization arguments complain of overbreadth—statutes that
criminalize conduct that most people believe to be innocent, innocuous or trivial.
Frequent examples of this type include the federal misdemeanors against unauthorized
use of Smokey the Bear’s image or against disturbing mud in a cave on federal land and a
long list of obscure, often comical state misdemeanors.14 Outdated morals offenses
9

Stuntz, supra note 1, at 514.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (felony of taking a motor vehicle by force or intimidation “with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury”). See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenonmenon, 54 Am. U.
L. Rev. 703, 708 (2005) (calling this statute “superfluous” because it “deal[s] with conduct addressed by
existing provisions”); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 610 & n.88 (2005) (noting
carjacking statute); Sara Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 755-56 & n.31 (2005) (noting carjacking statute); Robinson &
Cahill, supra note 8, at 171 (same). Robinson and Cahill, who have spent more time than anyone analyzing
state criminal codes, note other examples of redundancy. In addition to a general theft offense, for
example, the Illinois legislature (like others) has specific theft offenses for theft of delivery containers,
library materials, and other specified forms of property. See id. at 170 & nn.4-6 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/16-1 (general theft), 5/16E-3(a) (retail theft), 5/16B-2(a) (library) (1993)).
11
Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 170 (citing Illinois statutes barring damage to library materials,
animal facilities, delivery containers and “anhydrous ammonia equipment”).
12
Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1, at 637 &n.16 (citing duplicative theft provisions in Illinois
and Kentucky).
13
Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 249,
289 (1998) (counting 325 federal fraud or misrepresentation offenses); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 517 (noting
“100 separate misrepresentation offenses” in the federal code).
14
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 4302(1), 4302(5), 4306(a)(1), 4306(b) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2000)
(misdemeanor for unauthorized use of “Smokey the Bear” name); see also Douglas Husak, Retribution in
10
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against adultery, fornication, and sodomy fit this category, as well as some gambling and
alcohol offenses15 and crimes targeting outdated social problems such as railroad
trespass.16 Especially in federal law, some such crimes are more serious and carry
substantial penalties. Expansive use of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to cover even
breaches of fiduciary duty are notable examples.17
Complaints about these two main types of crime expansion are relate to other,
ancillary concerns, such as code disorganization—many new provisions are scattered
throughout statute books, outside of the criminal code. They are sometimes poorly
drafted, which can lead to doctrinal incoherence such as inconsistent use of mens rea
terms, and to distributive injustice when comparable conduct is charged under similar
statutes that yield different sentences.18 Finally, a separate but related complaint
addresses not crimes but sentences: even for appropriately defined crimes, punishment
levels can be excessive. Interestingly, complaints about overcriminalization extend back
at least to the 1960s (versions of the argument occur even earlier),19 when incarceration
rates were a fraction of current levels,20 the death penalty was in full desuetude, and
federal criminal law not yet expanded in narcotics and other state-regulated offenses

Criminal Theory, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 959, 962-63 (2000) (citing these two statutes). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 711a (2000) (unauthorized use of Woodsy Owl image); 18 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (unauthorized use of Red
Cross emblem). See Green, supra note 3, at 1610-14 (describing and defending the federal crime, created
by statute and regulation, that punishes sellers who remove mattress tags before sale). For lists of odd state
offenses, see Luna, supra note 10, at 704; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 516-17.
15
See, e.g., Beale, supra note 10, at 750-53 (describing state morals legislation a form of
overcriminalization). Morals offenses are the focus of David A.J. Richards’ book-length critique of
overcriminalization, Sex Drugs and Death: An Essay on Human Rights and Overcriminalization (1982).
This complaint is at least a generation old. See Kadish, supra note 3, at 159-65 (criticizing morals
legislation).
16
See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 556 & n.185 (citing Virginia’s many railroad-specific crimes). The failure of
legislatures to repeal outdated statutes was a central concern of Guido Calebresi, A Common Law for the
Age of Statutes (1982).
17
See John C. Coffee Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: Restoration of the Public-Private Distinction, 35 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 427 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr. Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Civil and Criminal Models and
What Can be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875 (1992) (hereafter Paradigms Lost); John C. Coffee Jr.,
Does Unlawful Mean Criminal? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law,
71 B.U.L. Rev. 193 (1991) (hereinafter Tort/Crime).
18
See Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra note 1; Paul H. Robinson et al., Five Worst (and Five Best)
American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
19
See infra text at nn. 208-13.
20
But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates
in Empirical Research?, (January 2006 draft) available at ssrn.com/abstract_id=880129 (suggesting
“confinement” rates have held steady over the last century if we aggregrate prison and mental hospital
populations).
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central to current overcriminalization critiques.21 Nonetheless, there is much to this
punishment criticism. Every state and the federal government have added severe
mandatory minimum punishments in recent decades,22 federal sentencing guidelines
increased sentences for many crimes,23 and some jurisdictions eliminated parole or
restricted other mechanisms for early release.24 As a result, American incarceration rates
skyrocketed over the last three decades to levels that now far outpace those in any other
western or democratic nation.25
Redundancy and overbreadth have several potential ill effects, but they are largely
distinct effects. Overbreadth inappropriately criminalizes normatively legitimate
conduct. That unnecessarily infringes liberty, and it increases police and prosecutorial
power by providing more grounds for arrest and conviction. Redundancy, by definition,
does not expand criminal law’s scope; it “re-criminalizes” conduct already prohibited,
and most examples point to conduct that is appropriately barred—theft, assault, fraud and
the like.26 Courts have a few means to control prosecutor manipulation of the charge
options created by overlapping offenses, through concurrent sentencing, merging
offenses, and rules mandating that specific statutes supercede general ones or those with

21

See Kadish, supra note 3; Herbert Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction 249-95 (1968); Sanford H.
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1963).
22
For description and criticism, see, e.g., Paul Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (and a Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (2004); Marc
Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 9, 11 (1999); Gary T.
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing
Reform, 81 Cal. L.Rev. 61 (1993).
23
See U.S. Sent. Commission, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the
Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration and
Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining 378-81 (1991) (reporting that federal sentences nearly
doubled between 1984 and 1990 with the adoption of the guidelines and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986);
Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?, The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal
Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 24 (1997).
24
A majority of states still have parole in some form. For a comprehensive list of state parole laws, see
Taylor Menlove, Parole and Truth-in-Sentencing State Survey (memo on file with the author).
25
American incarceration levels now stand at about 700 inmates per 100,000 population. From 1900 to
1970, the U.S. rate was about 110 per 100,000, a rate roughly equal to the current highest national
incarceration rates in Western Europe. See Roy Walmsley, United Kingdom Home Office Research,
Development and Statistics Directorate, World Prison Population List 1, 5 (3d ed. 2002). Yet U.S. prison
populations rose as mental hospital confinements declined, so overall involuntary confinement has held
fairly constant. See Harcourt, supra note 20.
26
One exception is offense definitions, such as the federal mail fraud statute, that are broad enough to
capture both clear wrongdoing and more marginal or morally ambiguous conduct. See Coffee, Tort/Crime,
supra note 17.
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lesser punishments for the same conduct trump more severe ones.27 But those doctrines
are fairly weak, and redundant crimes, especially if coupled with sentencing variations
for similar offenses, can also increase enforcement officials’ power. Expansive
substantive law undermines criminal procedure restrictions, because more crimes mean
more bases for police to find probable cause to stop and arrest, and redundant crimes give
prosecutors more power to choose statutes with easier proof requirements, to punish the
same conduct multiple times, to effectively choose punishments when similar statutes
carry different penalties, and thereby to gain bargaining leverage by increasing risks of
trial.28 That bargaining leverage leads to plea bargains inappropriately replacing trials
and may play a role in wrongful convictions.29 Specifying these alleged effects of
overcriminalization is important, because I argue in the final Part that overbreadth—
criminalizing innocent or innocuous conduct—has little effect in practice, save for small
subsets of federal prosecution; most claims of excessive criminalization relate to offenses
that are trivial and rarely enforced. Likewise, redundancy probably plays a lesser role in
adding to prosecutorial power and plea bargains than commonly assumed.
One feature of this debate merits emphasis. While many complaints about
overcriminalization point to state codes, much critical literature focuses on federal

27

See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 596 S.E.2d 147 (2004) (holding defendant could be punished only
under statute for misdemeanor statutory rape, not felony child molestation, due to lenity doctrines dictating
that specific statutes trump general ones and lesser punishments prevail over greater ones). Such doctrines
are of limited reach; prosecutors can sometimes avoid court supervision of this type by charging only the
more severe offense, rather than multiple, overlapping offenses.
28
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale
L.J. 1 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 1 (1996) (hereafter Civil-Criminal Line). The recognition that wide-ranging criminal laws
encourage and facilitate abusive enforcement discretion is not entirely new; scholars and activists raised
similar arguments against morals crimes in the first several decades of the twentieth century. See, e.g.,
Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy: Abortion, Homosexuality
and Drug Addiction 79-80 (1965) (arguing antihomosexuality laws “encourage[] … police corruption and
repressive enforcement procedures”); William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York,
1920-1980, 5 Yale J.L. & Hum. 265, 280 (1993); Packer, supra note 21, at 328-31 (“police corruptions is
closely associated with … vice control” and arguing use of police “decoys” as an enforcement strategy
against prostitution is “disgusting”).
29
Cf. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 79 (2005) (proposing a measure of excessive plea bargaining, discussing wrongful conviction risks
and attributing causal effect to prosecutorial power but not overcriminalization); William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004).
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criminal law. A few critiques focus exclusively on federal criminal law,30 and nearly all
include federal law as dominant (often recurrent) examples of each form of the
problem,31 whether it be excessive punishment or criminalization of the trivial behavior
and conduct best left to civil regulation.32 This distinction is important, because
overcriminalization is worse in the federal context: its costs are greater there and its
amelioration less likely.
Scholars explain overcriminalization largely with an account of legislative failure
and democratic process dysfunction. Legislatures treat criminal law differently from
most other topics of public policy—proposals for new crimes and increased punishments
pass legislatures more easily than other types of legislation, while repeal or reform of
crimes and punishment face unusually long odds for enactment. This is so, scholars
argue, for understandable reasons: majority preferences lean strongly and consistently in
favor of expanded offenses and more severe punishment. Interest group influences work
strongly in one direction: prosecutors are especially effective lobbyists for criminal law
expansion33 and other interest groups lobby for specific crimes; shippers, for instance,
seek a special theft-of-delivery-container offense for conduct covered by a general theft
definition.34 High-profile crimes prompt legislatures to react with redundant statutes, and
there is little downside to doing so. Rarely does an interest group of significant influence
emerge to counter the influence of prosecutors, and legislatures can enact new crimes
cost-free—they need not repeal old ones or appropriate tax dollars. (Importantly, that is
not true with sentencing increases; incarceration costs a lot of money, and that constrains
30

See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 3; Baker, supra note 3; ABA Report, supra note 3; Green, supra note 3;
cf. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 10 (arguing expansive federal criminal law is a key factor in making
pretextual prosecutions a bigger problem in federal than state law enforcement).
31
See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 555-65; Luna, supra note 10; Beale, supra note 10, at 753-73. Paul
Robinson’s work is an exception; he has devoted much exclusive attention to state criminal codes. See,
e.g., Robinson, supra note 18.
32
For arguments about the appropriateness of non-criminal regulation for conduct governed by criminal
statutes, see, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1802 (1992) (arguing for “the shrinking of the criminal law in order to fit it into
its proper role in the law of sanctions, next to an expanding arena of punitive civil sanctions.”); Green,
supra note 3, at 1610; Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 28; Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 17;
Coffee, Tort/Crime, supra note 17; Packer, supra note 21, at 249-95.
33
See Stuntz, supra note 1; Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 U.C.L.A. 715, 728-29 (2005);
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 587- 88 (2002) (describing prosecutors’ strong lobbying influence in Congress on
criminal justice legislation).
34
See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 1, at 637 & n.16 (citing this example in Illinois).
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sentencing policy.) All these elements make criminal justice a singular case in legislative
process: criminal law expands unusually easily, and its contraction is unusually difficult.
The growth in raw numbers of offenses-on-the-books is undeniable, but this story
leaves out much about criminal law’s substantive evolution in recent decades, and it
conflicts with much of what we know about legislative process. Criminal law has
contracted in important respects in the last century thanks in large part to legislatures,
and small-scale reforms continually occur in contemporary legislatures. That record
reveals a picture of criminal law as a topic of much more ordinary fate in legislatures than
scholars often suggest. And legislative adjustments are supplemented by prosecutorial
and judicial restraints on criminal law’s reach that bring criminal law in closer alignment
with democratic preferences. Code expansion occurs at the same time, but the
combination of these effects is fairly viewed not so much as overcriminalization as an
ongoing reformulation of criminal justice policy that roughly tracks changes in
majoritarian preferences or social movement influence, overlaid with ordinary amounts
(relative to other public policy topics) of legislative imperfection in defining and abiding
by those preferences.
II. Legislatures and Criminal Law
A. Criminal law’s stability.
One expects the core of substantive criminal law to remain fairly static. Core
crimes against persons, property, and the state are nearly universally criminalized over
time. These include varieties of battery, homicide, intimidation, trespass, theft, robbery
and fraud as well as bribery, perjury and other conduct that undermines public
institutions. But we also expect change outside this core, and to some degree within it,
with technological and social change. Treating horse theft especially harshly made sense
when horses were more socially valuable; later, we expect to see offenses tailored for
auto theft. Offenses must be updated for harassment by telephone and trespass via
computer networks. Batteries that were once not criminalized—against spouses and
children, for instance—become criminalized with changes in social mores that condemn
domestic violence. Odd offenses—against organized cock fighting or dog fighting, say—
may be plausible when those practices arise but majorities disapprove. Moreover,
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punishment polices vary over time as social beliefs in deterrence, rehabilitation, dignitary
interests or alternative sanctions change.35 In England, all felons once faced the death
penalty;36 many non-murderers formerly did in the United States.
Those shifts notwithstanding, more criminal law change occurs with respect to
conduct for which the harm is more diffuse or contestable (especially when the victim is
a voluntary participant), and when society has other, clear policy options for addressing
disfavored conduct beyond criminal law. Examples here include consensual sex crimes,
alcohol policy, gambling regulation, drug usage, sexually explicit media, the time and
place of market transactions, and speech against state policies or officials.
These kinds of criminal law reform are not merely sporadic examples scattered
over two centuries of history. Contemporary legislatures abolish crimes, reduce
punishments, and decline to enact new criminal statutes with some regularity. Of course,
the first two moves should be less common than the third; it is always harder for
legislatures to pass bills than to fail to do so. Inaction is nonetheless suggestive, because
one premise of overcriminalization scholarship is that crime creation and punishment
increases have a distinctly easy time overcoming familiar hurdles to legislative success.
B. The evolution of substantive criminal law.
A long view of criminal law’s evolution reveals a dramatic contraction of its
scope, even as it has expanded in some areas. Colonial criminal law had a breadth and
severity unimaginable now. A son who disobeyed his parents could face the death
penalty; failing to attend church, working on Sundays (or even kissing one’s spouse on
the Sabbath) were all crimes, as were the familiar range of consensual sexual offenses,
bearing children out of wedlock, cursing, or failing to work on other days other than
Sunday.37 The more relevant comparisons, however, are to more recent history. Taking
as a baseline the period around the turn of the twentieth century, we find both widespread
patterns of decriminalization throughout the last several decades and thereby a strong
argument that criminal law’s reach into citizens’ lives is substantially less than it was less
than a century ago, in large part due to legislative action.
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See Garland, supra note 6; Whitman, supra note 6.
See generally Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England (1991).
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See Lawrence Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 31-58 (1993).
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Consensual sex was a topic of widespread criminalization in the Progressive era
around the turn of the twentieth century.38 In that era every state criminalized sodomy
and many criminalized non-marital, consensual sex and adultery, sometimes at the felony
level, and even some sexual conduct by married couples.39 But consensual sex has been
an equally active topic for decriminalization since the early 1970s, largely by legislative
repeal. Illinois repealed its sodomy law in 1962. Connecticut did so in 196740 (two years
after it unsuccessfully argued for the constitutionality of its criminal ban on contraception
distribution in Griswold v. Connecticut). Between 1971 and 2001, legislatures in twentyfive states and the District of Columbia followed suit.41 (In another ten states, state
supreme courts held that sodomy statutes violated state constitutions.42 In none of those
states did legislatures succeed in amending state constitutions to allow sodomy
prohibitions.) That widespread trend toward decriminalization left only 15 jurisdictions
with sodomy statutes on the books at the time Lawrence v. Texas43 declared such statutes
unconstitutional. And that trend occurred despite the statutes’ rare use against consensual
sex (which might generate public disapproval) and despite their utility for prosecutors in
sexual assault cases that are difficult to prove under more appropriate rape or assault
statutes.44
Comparably, Congress, states and localities in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries also widely criminalized expressive conduct, especially when
38

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet 328-51 (1999) (collecting
early state and local criminal laws regulating sexual conduct, many of which were enacted in the years
before and after the turn of the twentieth century); Joanna Grossman Separated Spouses, 53 Stan. L. Rev.
1613, 1625-26 (2001); see also Robert W. Haney, Comstockery in America (1960) (history of the
movement for censorship and other morals legislation).
39
See, Eskridge, supra note 38, at 328-37 (listing state sodomy laws); Richard A. Posner & Katharine B.
Silbaugh, A Guide to America’s Sex Laws 65-71 & 98-110 (1996) (listing state sodomy, fornication and
adultery laws as of 1996); see, e.g., Va. Code § 18.2-361 (defining oral and anal sex as felonies without
regard to martial status of offenders).
40
Friedman, supra note 37, at 345, citing Laws Conn. 1967, p.1618.
41
American Civil Liberties Union, Crime and Punishment in America: State-by-State Breakdown of
Existing Laws and Repeals (June 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/crimjustice/11982res20030609.html. See also W. Eskridge, supra note 38, at 32851 (listing dates of repeal of sodomy and other sexual-conduct crimes); Posner & Silbaugh, supra note 39,
at 65-71 (listing all states’ statute, or lack of statute, governing sodomy). Nevada proved particularly
amenable to change in this period: it enacted its sodomy statute in 1977 and repealed it in 1993. See id.;
1977 Nev. Stats. p. 1632, Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.193 (sodomy statute enacted in 1977); see also 1993 Nev.
Stats. p. 518 (repealing Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.193).
42
ACLU, Crime and Punishment in America, supra note 41.
43
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
44
See Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1520 (1989).
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sexually suggestive (including lewd dress and cross-dressing) but also when overtly
political. At the height of World War I, Congress severely criminalized speech critical of
the U.S. government with the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.45 The
statutes made it a felony offense to, among other things, use “disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States government, flag, or armed
forces.46 Yet in the wake of the war’s end, Congress repealed most of the statutes’
provisions.47 Congress and federal officials also barred explicit or obscene publications.
Film and book censorship, mostly focused on obscene and immoral content, was
aggressively enforced in many jurisdictions in the 1920s and 1930s through criminal
prosecutions as well as civil actions; targets famously included such novels as Lady
Chatterley’s Lover, An American Tragedy, and Candide.48 Those activities were also
decriminalized in the latter part of the twentieth century through a mix of legislative and
judicial action. Contemporary examples of jurisdictions seeking to regulate obscene and
explicit conduct or media—especially outside of child pornography—pale in comparison
to such regulation 75 years ago, even though First Amendment doctrine provides some
(much diminished) basis for such restrictions.49
One finds the same pattern with respect to criminalization of contraception, which
was prohibited or restricted by federal law and in a patchwork of states a century ago.50
(Merely advocating repeal of laws restricting contraception could result in criminal
conviction for “breach of the peace.”)51 But by the time of Griswold v. Connecticut, most
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Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
Eugene Debs, among others, was famously sentenced to ten years in prison under these provisions. The
statute’s constitutionality was affirmed in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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Portions of the statute remain at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794.
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See Paul S. Boyer, Purity in Print: The Vice-Society Movement and Book Censorship in America (1968);
Nelson, supra note 28, at 266-75; Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54 (recounting examples of works that
were bases of obscenity prosecutions or bans).
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See Friedman, supra note 37, at 350-54 (describing changes in obscenity regulation and attributing
liberalization to popular culture shifts); W. Eskridge, supra note 38, at 338-41 (collecting municipal sex
offense ordinances 1850-1950); id. at 174-204 (describing evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence that
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50
See Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 39 Cornell L.Q. 275, 27579 (1964) (collecting state and federal laws restricting contraception devices); Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
1461-62 (1958), 38 Stat. 194 (1913), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1958) (criminalizing distribution of obscene
materials and distribution of contraceptive devices in federal enclaves and through the mail).
51
See People v. Swasey, 180 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Gen. Sessions N.Y. County 1920) (conviction for advocating
repeal of anti-contraception laws overturned on other grounds). See also People v. Morris, 18 N.Y.S. 448
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1940) (conviction for distributing literature on venereal disease cures sustained);
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had been repealed; only Massachusetts restricted contraceptive use with anything like the
severity of Connecticut’s criminal statute barring use and distribution of contraceptives
even to married couples.52 A comparable story describes the history of criminal
miscegenation statutes. Interracial marriage was criminalized in at least thirty states at
the midpoint of the twentieth century. In the fifteen years before the Supreme Court
declared such statutes unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia,53 half of those states
repealed their miscegenation bans, a trend the Court noted in support of its decision.54
(We will note this same pattern below with respect to restrictions on the use of capital
punishment: state legislative reform led the way for constitutional interpretation
restricting punishment.)55
Decriminalization in these areas manifests a trend in public culture that
legislatures (and courts) often reflect through law reform. We see the same pattern in
gaming regulation, which is regulated by a mix of criminal and civil statutes.56 Nevada
prohibited all gambling in 1909; it repealed that prohibition in 1931.57

Others followed

to lesser degrees. In the 1930s twenty-one states legalized race tracks and betting on
races. In the 1940s and ’50s, most states decriminalized pari-mutuel betting and lowstakes charity gaming. By 1996, forty states allowed pari-mutuel betting, thirty-eight
states had state lotteries, and twenty-six had casinos.58 Gambling is the kind of activity
that standard theories of legislative process would predict to be a likely candidate for
decriminalization. Strong interest groups exist to lobby for legalized gambling, and states
stands to gain revenue from gaming activity. Gambling is voluntary, consensual conduct,
People v. Vickers, 19 N.Y.S. 165 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1940) (conviction for lewd dancing sustained). For
a general survey and discussion, see Nelson, supra note 28.
52
See Comment, supra note 50, at 277-79 (summarizing status of state contraception laws by the early
1960s); Griswold v. Connecticut, Appellant’s Brief, at n.23 (noting contraceptive devices can be legally
used and prescribed in 48 of 50 states).
53
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
54
Id. at 6 & n.5 (listing states that abolished miscegenation crimes); see Walter Wadlington, The Loving
Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective," 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189 (1966) (only
16 states still had antimiscegenation laws in 1967).
55
See infra notes __-__ (discussing Roper, Atkins and Coker as well as earlier legislative constriction of
death penalty eligibility).
56
See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: A Guide for Internet Gambling (2001) available at
http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/InternetAdsGuidelines.html (describing civil and criminal regulations
governing gambling promotion).
57
American Gaming Association,
http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/general_info_detail.cfv?id=12
58
See id.
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and government has other means to address the core criminal harms associated with
gambling, such as control of gaming operations by organized crime groups.
National alcohol prohibition, instituted in 1919 with the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment and the Volstead Act (along with similar state statutes criminalizing alcohol
distribution), was a sweeping criminalization that followed years of local moves to
criminalize alcohol distribution.59 It was followed, of course, by a sweeping legislative
decriminalization in 1933 with the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment.60 That
repeal left alcohol regulation again as a state and local decision, and the trend since the
1930s has been a steady decline in criminalization, in most respects,61 of alcohol sales
and use.
One component of post-Prohibition alcohol law is “blue laws” that restrict alcohol
sales, often along with other retail activity, and that are often enforced with low-level
criminal penalties.62 The trend here is similar, and for similar reasons. Legislative action
on laws governing Sunday alcohol and retail sales have been uniformly in one direction
in recent years: deregulation and decriminalization. Here again we find powerful interest
groups—alcohol manufacturers and distributors and retail stores—lobbying on the side of
decriminalization.63 Another class of low-level crimes that some legislatures abandoned
over the last two decades is minor traffic offenses; several states have rewritten those
offenses as civil infractions instead of misdemeanors,64 despite the Uniform Vehicle
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For an overview, see Friedman, supra note 37, at 339-41.
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See, e.g., Va. Code §§ 18.2-341, -342, -343 (criminal components of “blue laws” repealed in 2004); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:171-1.1 9 (criminalizing certain Sunday sales).
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See Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S., Sunday Sales, at http://www.discus.org/govt_affairs/sunday/
(listing states in recent years that have relaxed restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales); Clifford J. Levy,
Drink, Don’t Drink. Drink, Don’t Drink, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2005 (describing recent alcohol law reforms
in several states including Kansas); Associated Press, Kansas Liquor Laws May Soon Mirror Most of
Nation, May 5, 2005 (noting that since 2002, 11 states have repealed Sunday bans on liquor sales),
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15249; see also David N. Laband &
Deborah H. Leinbuch, Blue Laws: The History, Economics and Politics of Sunday-Closing Laws, (1987)
(recounting history and status of blue laws in all states as of 1987).
64
See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Summary of State Speed Laws (5th ed. 2001)
(collecting state laws, penalties and procedures on speeding and related traffic offenses such as reckless
driving and racing). See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 22351, 40000.1, 42001(a) (traffic offenses denoted
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denoted noncriminal petty offenses); Va. Code Ann. §§ 46.2-113, 46.2-878.1, 46.2-878.2 (speeding law
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Code’s recommendation.65 This is surely an example of decriminalization with broad
popular support because it involves offenses that most people commit.66
More serious core crimes are also subject to reform or abolition. Significantly,
there is a very strong trend of decriminalizing certain weapons offenses. Over the last
two decades, most states have abolished crimes of carrying concealed weapons, which
often carried felony penalties for repeat offenses. Currently, only four states still
criminalize carrying concealed firearms and other weapons.67 The reason for this trend is
not hard to discern: the National Rifle Association has led a concerted effort to convince
every state legislature to change the carrying of concealed weapons from a crime to a
statutory right. Other groups have opposed these reforms, and public opinion has been
roughly split in many jurisdictions, yet the NRA’s campaign has met with consistent
success.68 Similar interest-group dynamics explain the decriminalization that occurred
when Congress failed to reauthorize the federal assault weapons ban in 2004.69
The same interest groups also drive legislatures to (modestly) decriminalize other
conduct through expansion of defenses. In 2005, Florida enacted a statute—popularly
labeled the “Stand Your Ground” law—that eliminated any duty for one employing force
in self-defense to retreat even from public places instead of using force when it is safe to
do so.70 That change makes legal what was once a criminal use of force. This reform is
less meaningful for present purposes but worth noting. It shows again how powerful
interest groups sometimes lobby for decriminalization; the NRA pushed the Florida law

violations denoted noncriminal infractions). For a bibliography on decriminalization of traffic offenses, see
National Center for State Courts, CourTopics: Traffic Offenses, available at http://www.ncsconline.org.
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National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Uniform Vehicle Code (revised 2000),
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/speedlaws501/uvcspeep.pdf.
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See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006)
(arguing legislatures respond to popular preferences on crimes that affect large segments of the populace).
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See Neb. Stat. § 28-1202 (2005); Kan. Stat. § 21-4201 (2005); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1 (2005); Wisc.
Stat. § 941.23 (2005). Those making the case for overcriminalization can cite Illinois’s statute, which
makes it a misdemeanor to carry a “slung-shot.”
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For a detailed of this reform process and interest groups’ roles in Missouri, as well as a history of this
reform trend more broadly, see William T. Horner, Showdown in the Show-Me State: The Fight over
Conceal-and-Carry Gun Laws in Missouri (2005); see id. at 2 & 7 (noting that a small majority of Missouri
voters rejected ballot referendum to legalize concealed weapons, and noting public opinion surveys show
slight majorities in many states oppose decriminalization of concealed weapons). See also
http://www.nraila.org (National Rifle Association website).
69
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (codifying Title XI of the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, which expired in Sept. 2004).
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Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2005). For an earlier, similar statute, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5(2).
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and plans the same campaign in other states.71 It also demonstrates how criminal liability
can contract even for violent crimes when the debate is framed in a politically appealing
way.
On this latter point, consider how legislatures have explicitly decriminalized other
core violent conduct. Intra-family assault and battery was the subject of
decriminalization for a period in the mid-twentieth century. In 1962, New York modeled
a trend of that period among many states when its legislature passed a statute allowing
domestic violence victims to bring civil actions in family court rather than filing criminal
complaints (the act required criminal courts to transfer proceedings to the family court),
so that judicial responses to domestic violence would focus on reconciliation and
treatment rather than criminal punishment.72 Through the 1960s and 1970s, courts used
the statute to transfer the full range of violent conduct to a civil forum—burglary,
weapons, harassment and assault-with-intent-to-commit-incest charges were handled
civilly.73 The pendulum has swung the other way more recently; we mostly treat
domestic violence again as a criminal matter. But the history nonetheless reveals a
pendulum rather than a one-way ratchet: criminal law ebbs and flows in response to
public opinion and social movement pressure.
On top of such broad trends, low-level, modest changes contracting the scope of
criminal codes appear not to be uncommon. In 2004, Virginia abolished clearly wrongful
but rarely prosecuted theft and fraud offenses such as conversion of military property,
sale of goods of another with failure to pay over proceeds, and overvaluation of property
for purposes of influencing lending institution74 (as well as sillier ones such as the crime
of jumping from railroad cars).75 In 2003, Alabama redefined some felony thefts as
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misdemeanors by raising the amount required to make a theft punishable as a felony;76
Colorado raised amounts for a range of theft and fraud offenses a few years earlier
(changes that make a rough effort at adjusting crime definitions for inflation).77 Colorado
also abolished most loitering offenses (preserving only a ban on loitering on school
grounds), repealed crimes of circulating political material without identifying the
sponsor, downgraded the status of a harassment-by-stalking offense and reduced
penalties for some drug offenders.78 A few years earlier, many states lowered the age of
consent for sex, thereby abolishing the crime of statutory rape when it involved older
teenagers.79
Even drug crimes, a dominant category on criminal dockets and the subject of
expansive criminal legislation and sentencing increases in recent times, have been the
subject of some reform. In the last decade, voters in ten states endorsed ballot initiatives
or referenda decriminalizing the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.80 The effect of
those changes is constrained because federal law continues to criminalize all marijuana
use, and federal officials continue to enforce these federal crimes despite state law
changes and local public sentiment (a telling example of how varying structures of
democratic institutions can yield different outcomes from the same popular preferences).
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Raich v. Gonzales,81 state
decriminalization is largely symbolic; we may see fewer such reforms for that reason.
But the reforms to date nonetheless demonstrate notable democratic reform for criminal
law, and other examples will have real effects. Voters approved 17 of 19 ballot
initiatives between 1996 and 2002 that either decriminalized some marijuana use,
reduced drug-possession punishments or mandated related reforms such as limiting asset
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forfeiture or directing its proceeds to drug treatment.82 That public sentiment also
supports moderate legislative reform of drug crimes, such as Colorado’s.
The same political dynamics that purportedly drive overcriminalization also
should explain laws that increase punishment severity. Yet while legislatures have
dramatically increased prison sentences in recent decades, there is a modest countertrend:
they have also proven capable of reducing mandatory sentences and otherwise reforming
punishment policy in the direction of leniency.83 More than half the states have reformed
sentences in the direction of leniency in the last several years. They did so by various
means—often by eliminating mandatory minimums, increasing judicial discretion in
sentencing, or replacing incarceration with treatment for some drug offenders.84 In 2004
and 2005, the New York legislature passed successive statutes that reduced severe
mandatory sentencing requirements required by the state’s 1973 “Rockefeller” drug laws.
The first statute reduced mandatory punishment levels, and the reach of those
punishments, for more serious drug offenders; it also increased early-release possibilities
for some classes of previously sentenced offenders as well as future offenders and
expanded drug treatment options that are prerequisites for sentence reductions.85 The
second statute extended those reforms for less serious felony drug offenders.86 Those
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reforms are not unique. In 1998 Michigan reformed its mandatory life-without-parole
statute for large-quantity drug dealers.87
Legislatures have also limited the scope of the death penalty. Between 1981 and
2004, thirteen states enacted statutes that eliminated juvenile offenders from capital
punishment eligibility (and Washington state did so by judicial decision).88 Between
1986 and 2001, eighteen states enacted statutes removing mentally retarded offenders
from death penalty eligibility; bills to do the same passed in one or both houses of other
state legislatures but failed to become law.89 The Supreme Court cited these consistent
legislative trends as evidence of a national consensus on capital punishment limitations
that the Court used to support constitutional rules that barred juveniles and the mentally
retarded from death eligibility.90 Despite increasing use of capital punishment in the last
twenty years,91 these restrictions continued a tradition of restricting the scope of capital
punishment eligibility.92 In the wake of Furman v. Georgia in the early 1970s, only three
states that reinstituted the death penalty applied it beyond murder to rape. Before
Furman, that number had gradually declined, through legislative reform, to sixteen.93 All
those changes are, in a real sense, modest shifts around the edges of death penalty
87
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administration. But they are also examples of legislatures overcoming inertia to vote
affirmatively to limit capital punishment in states where voters support the penalty.
All of this suggests that, despite scholars’ worries, accretion of criminal statutes in
recent decades does not mean we are moving closer to a the day that our state criminal
codes makes everyone a felon; legislatures can make major as well as minor reforms that
contract criminal law without public opposition. The worry about the scope of criminal
law touching widely in ordinary people’s lives was as legitimate—probably much more
so—75 or 100 years ago, when vice, speech/expression, explicit media and lifestyle
crimes (including bans on contraception and use of profanity) were at their peak.94
Prohibition made criminals of many Americans, and recall that Prohibition continued
locally in many areas long past 1933. Hold aside colonial-era comparisons that come
from a pre-constitutional culture, and hold aside as well Jim Crow laws that made
criminals of African Americans in many parts of the country for innocuous conduct—and
would have done so more often had those laws95 and the social practices supporting them
been less effective in achieving high compliance.96 Criminal law has substantially
contracted in all these realms of private, social and morals-related conduct, even as it
expanded in other dimensions, such as regulatory crimes. Criminal law today often
punishes too harshly, but criminal law’s practical scope for most people—its regulation
of most citizens’ lives (as opposed to its reach in white-collar and corporate contexts) is
narrower than a century ago. The problem of punishing conduct that is widely viewed as
wholly innocent is fairly minimal in practice. Because of criminal law’s multiple levels
of democratic responsiveness, those instances are isolated rather than systemic, and they
are not plausibly worse than a century ago.
C. International Comparisons
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As a final reference point, note there is little evidence American criminal law is
substantively broader than codes in other comparable democracies, though American
incarceration rates are higher. Comparative criminal scholarship focuses mostly on
procedure and sentencing; what comparative scholarship exists on substantive law
concentrates on “general part” issues rather than specific crime definitions. Where
scholars have addressed this question, however—especially regulation of expressive and
offensive conduct—we see other Western democracies criminalize conduct that
American jurisdictions do not. Germany criminalizes not only offensive or provocative
language but the expression of certain ideas, such as insults to religious denominations or
minority groups, arguments against democratic government, and denial of the
Holocaust.97 The last is also a crime in many democracies including Israel, Austria,
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands; France criminalizes public denial of crimes
against humanity, including minimizing the number of concentration camp victims.98
Most of those laws were enacted in the 1980s and 1990s to supplement existing criminal
laws against racial discrimination.99 Canada also criminalizes (far more broadly than
American hate-crimes offenses) core political speech when it contains expressions of
racial hatred or bias that threaten equality, dignity and multiculturalism norms, and it is
also more restrictive on pornography distribution.100
Germany, like other European nations, also has expansive criminal law against
“insult”—offenses that protect personal dignity and respect and that punish expressions
such as “jerk,” use of the informal pronoun for “you,” and gesturing insultingly by giving
“the finger” (regularly enforced with fines over $1,100).101 European nations also legally
97
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protect privacy in ways American law does not; in France it is a crime to post nude
pictures of another on the internet, and press publication of facts about another’s private
life can be a contravention—a petty criminal offense.102
Comparative literature is thinner on other substantive crime topics, but there are
not indicia of notably narrower codes on other issues. The general scope of drug
prohibition doesn’t seem to be notably narrower in other western democracies; even the
Netherlands, at the libertarian extreme with a code that long eschewed moralism as a
basis for offense definitions, criminalizes drugs in its code but functionally
decriminalizes through non-enforcement.103 (The same approach characterizes Dutch law
on euthanasia.)104 Local enforcement patterns might show much divergence across
jurisdictions, but coordinated international efforts on drug enforcement are one indicator
of a widespread commitment to fight large-scale narcotics distribution with criminal
law.105 The English criminalize theft of trade secrets, postal or telephone harassment,
electronic surveillance, and disclosure of confidential information.106 Many European
countries have expanded crimes and penalties for private pornography possession,
especially for images of children.107 More comparative work might find other
democracies have fewer trivial or redundant offenses or narrower offense definitions for
fraud. But from these glimpses, at least, there is little basis for a claim that American
criminal law is overbroad compared to other western nations.
D. Legislative inaction.
Finally, consider the record of legislative inaction. Failure is the norm for
legislative proposals, because the legislative process is rife with vetogates108—procedural
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points at which bills can be blocked. Many vetogates provide occasions to kill a proposal
without legislators formally voting on the bill. If criminal law has unusual advantages in
overcoming these hurdles, it must somehow finesse the multiple opportunities legislators
have to halt a bill’s progress through logrolling, creation of new coalitions and other
strategic behavior that imperils typical legislation.109 This is the argument, often made
implicitly, by overcriminalization scholars: coalitions for crime creation are easy to form
and unusually stable, in part because the imbalance of interest group power, lopsided
public sentiment, and political salience of crime bills help broaden and stabilize these
coalitions.110 The commonly employed image is that the criminal law legislative process
is a “one way ratchet” for increasing substantive law’s scope and sentencing severity.111
There is some evidence for this, particularly in Congress.112 Nonetheless,
examples abound of criminal law and sentencing bills failing even when they fit the
paradigm of easy-to-pass proposals.113 Consider two examples from the first session of
the 109th Congress. The Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act, H.B. 3889,
originally contained provisions to increase mandatory minimum sentences for
methamphetamine possession offenses. In November 2005, the House Judiciary
Committee unanimously approved an amendment, sponsored by the committee’s
Republican chairman, to eliminate those sentencing provisions from the bill.114 The
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Senate counterpart to this bill contains no provisions to increase mandatory sentences.115
On the other hand, the House fairly quickly passed H.B. 1279, the Gang Prevention and
Effective Deterrence Act, which created mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile
offenders in gang-related crimes. The Senate committee, however, failed to act on its
counterpart bill, S. 155, in the first session. That may be in part due to lobbying efforts
by groups that opposed the sentencing provisions. Those groups included not only the
ABA, the Judicial Conference (familiar, if often weak, opponents of mandatorysentencing laws) and Families Against Mandatory Minimums, but also the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers and the American Federation of
Independent Businesses.116
As a random state example, Virginia’s legislature in 2005 let die in committee
bills that would criminalize the creation of a secret compartment in a car to transport
drugs, interference with a phone call with the intent to prevent a victim from summoning
emergency assistance, assault of a state judge and use of fake discount coupons, as well
as penalty increases for injuring animals or committing murder pursuant to gang
orders.117 Since most bills fail, these examples prove little, except that bills for politically
appealing offenses do not necessarily “sail through the legislature”118 much more readily
than bills on other many other topics, and legislators can stop such proposals often
without recorded votes against them.
More systematic data is hard to generate. No comprehensive empirical analysis
exists on the success rate of criminal law bills in state legislatures or Congress (nor
apparently on other policy topics).119 We nonetheless have some data that work as rough
proxies and suggest criminal law proposals do not have distinctive success rates in
115
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American legislatures. We have solid data on the percentage of bills (on all topics) that
become law in every legislature. Passage rates vary greatly. In Congress, only about five
percent of bills become law. The percentage climbs substantially for state legislatures,
though with much variation: from 5.4 percent in Minnesota in a typical year and 15.2 in
Illinois to nearly 40 percent in California and over 60 percent in Arkansas, North Dakota
and Utah.120
Further, a few states have databases that categorize both bills and enactments by
subject matter. Data from those sources are suggestive. In Texas, for the 1997 general
session, the overall percentage of bills that were enacted was 26.7 percent.121 Searching
by four substantive criminal law categories,122 it turns out that only 19.75 percent of bills
in those categories passed both houses.123 Figures in Utah are similar. In the 1997
legislative session, the overall success rate of bills was 58.9 percent. For bills in the
“criminal code” category,124 however, the passage rate was only 47.5 percent.125 And in
Pennsylvania’s 1995-96 session only 7.38 percent of bills categorized under “crimes and
offenses” were enacted; the overall passage rate of all bills in that body that year was 7.9
percent.126
To be sure, these data are only suggestive. Criminal bills are not sorted by the
substantive content and thus the data may include bills that both create or abolish crimes,
that increase or decrease penalties, or that address the same issue; some bills may pass in
a future session; a multi-topic bill may pass while single-topic bills fail.127 Legislators
may gain credit for merely introducing bills that don’t pass, which still reflects an
incentive toward criminalization. But these measures are as suggestive as raw word- or
120
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offense-counts to measure codes’ growth, which don’t discount redundant criminalization
(though it does not increase criminal law’s scope) nor acknowledge legitimate new crime
definitions (for, say, computer crimes, environmental crimes or terrorism). And these
data nonetheless raise a question about the assumption that bills adding offenses and
penalties have a distinctly higher success rate in legislatures because members fear voting
against such proposals. This should not surprise: research on legislative process offers
explanations both for the common failure of bills and for legislators’ ability to support
bills that abolish offenses and reduce penalties.
III. Theories of Legislative Process
The record of legislative reform of criminal law raises suspicions about the
dominant story of criminal law’s peculiarly easy path to enactment. Something must
explain legislators’ abilities to vote for an array of decriminalization and punishmentreduction measures that should be effective fodder for campaign ads, and to vote
against—or avoid voting on—bills that increase criminalization and punishments. Part of
the explanation, especially for many speech-related, alcohol, and consensual sex crimes,
and perhaps some weapons offenses, lies in ordinary theories of legislatures’
responsiveness to social movements and broad shifts in majority preferences. But much
of this change is low-visibility legislative action (or inaction) not subject to powerful
lobbies or much public attention or other monitoring. Much of the explanation for these
actions lies in legislation scholarship, a body of work undervalued by criminal law
scholars and that, in turn, pays little direct attention to criminal justice issues.
A. Organizational variations among state legislatures and Congress.
Legislation research makes the overcriminalization story puzzling. Most
legislation fails because vetogates give interest groups, committees, legislative leaders, or
larger coalitions means to block legislation, often without recorded votes by most (or
any) legislators. Peverill Squire and Keith Hamm’s recent survey of research on state
legislatures documents that those bodies vary substantially in their organization compared
to Congress and to each other, making generalizations from congressional research
difficult. The focus on congressional research is natural in the broad range of policy
areas that federal policy dominates. But states dominate crime and punishment policy,
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and state legislatures vary greatly with regard to the very procedural rules and
frameworks that legislation scholars (focusing on Congress) have found to affect
legislative outcomes. Those rule variations, which alter the number and nature of
vetogates, are reflected the widely different passage rates for bills introduced in state
assemblies.
Congressional scholars have noted shifts in the power of parties, committees or
their chairs, and chamber leadership over time as congressional rules and norms have
changed.128 State legislatures show those same variations, but they hardly shift in unison
or in accord with Congress. As one example, scholars have measured the power of house
speakers in Congress and state legislatures over time. Congressional house speakers’
power has diminished over time: Speaker Cannon’s power far exceeded Speaker
Hastert’s. But speakers in the lower chamber of eleven states have powers that exceed
even Cannon’s, and the vast majority have power that exceed Hastert’s.129 Powerful
speakers can diminish or increase the effectiveness of many vetogates.
Further, committee power in state legislatures has not been nearly as thoroughly
studied as congressional committees, and those bodies show great variation along every
parameter: the number of committees per chamber; the rate at which they favorably
report bills referred to them (a measure of their effectiveness as vetogates) and the degree
to which they otherwise play an important role in the legislative process; the specification
of their jurisdiction; who appoints committee members; whether committee membership
accords with proportional representation rules or otherwise reflects median or majority
sentiments; and whether conference committees are used to resolve House and Senate
differences and by what decision rules.130 Committee procedures and germaneness rules
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may explain how reforms come more easily in some contexts than others. Colorado’s
repeal of its loitering offenses, harassment statute and anonymous-political-ads crimes
were bundled in a single bill that also increased punishment options for some juvenile
felony offenders, expanded liability for contributing to delinquency of minors and raised
some drug offense penalties while lowering others.131
Scholars also measure state legislatures’ “professionalization” through indicia
such as members’ pay, days in session, and amount of staff and other administrative
resources.132 Chambers vary greatly on those parameters as well, which creates an
uncertain variable. There is some evidence that “legislators enjoy increasing electoral
isolation from political tides as professionalization levels rise,” in part because “the
relationship of interest groups and legislators is mediated by professionalization.”133 On
the other hand, some scholarship suggests that states with more professionalized
legislatures have greater congruence between public opinion and policy outcomes.134
(Note that Congress is the most professionalized legislature, and scholars widely assume
that it is excessively well attuned to political tides on crime issues.)
All of these variations in legislative structure make untenable assumptions that
theories explaining congressional behavior will map easily onto state legislatures or,
more specifically, that theories of criminalization’s easy success in a particular legislative
regime will have strong explanatory force across the range of American legislative
bodies.135 Instead, this variation suggests some legislative models will be more effective
than others at moderating or otherwise shaping legislation on criminal law as well as
other topics. Democratic outcomes are “a product of specific institutional structures and
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legal rules” rather than unmediated manifestations of popular will.136 “The bills that are
regularly enacted owe their existence to institutional structures and agenda control by
party leaders as much as to majority rule.”137 The procedural and structural variations
among state legislatures, then, should yield different outcomes even if popular sentiment
on criminal law issues is consistent across jurisdictions. At least some existing legislative
structures should pose substantial roadblocks to any popular pressure for
overcriminalization.
B. Harnessing expertise and procedural frameworks for criminal law.
While legislatures vary in their standard rules and organizational features, they
sometimes adopt special rules on specific legislative topics. Elizabeth Garrett has
recently described models of “framework legislation” in Congress that structure decisionmaking in particular policy areas to solve collective action problems, increase or decrease
powers of committees or other players, or make certain substantive outcomes more likely
by, for example, insulating staff or bill drafters from partisan pressure.138 Congress’s
creation of the federal Sentencing Commission to overhaul sentencing policy is one
version of this practice and was adopted with just these sorts of goals in mind.139 Other
federal examples include the budget process,140 the Base Realignment and Closure Act
(which assigns initial decision-making to an independent commission and limits
Congress’s authority to change or reject the commission decisions), fast-track trade
legislation (which structures Congress’s involvement on trade agreements negotiated by
presidents), and a 1998 tax act that requires a “tax complexity analysis” on many tax
bills.141
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States’ uses of framework laws are vastly under-studied. Interestingly, however,
some states in recent years have devised special procedures for criminal law issues that fit
this framework description. Some states have established law reform or crime
commissions to which they delegate tasks of assessing needs for criminal law reform,
proposing legislation and analyzing legislators’ proposals.142 This is a model Congress
has used on a range of topics—military base closings, social security reform, security
reform after 9/11, and federal sentencing policy—but, tellingly, never for substantive
criminal law to ameliorate legislative dysfunction. Combined with Congress’s greater
ability to reap publicity from symbolic legislative action, which makes it more
tempting,143 that helps explain why expansion of the federal code is so much greater than
state codes.
Take two examples. The Virginia legislature charged its state crime commission
in 2001 with proposing revisions to the criminal code,144 and in 2004 the legislature
accepted the commission’s first set of recommendations and repealed a dozen rarely-used
criminal statutes. Those offenses were the sort scholars often complain about—silly
offenses such as unlawful use of words “Official Tourist Information” or bringing dogs
onto the Capitol Square, and antiquated ones such as jumping off railroad cars.145 They
also included the more serious theft, fraud and conversion offenses noted above.146 This
reform legislation also fixed some of the sorts of drafting problems that criminal code
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experts such as Paul Robinson urge.147 The commission proposed, and the legislature
adopted, a consistent definition of “mandatory minimum” sentence, which had formerly
varied across provisions. They moved non-crime statutes out of the criminal code, and
adopted a comprehensive penalty structure for felony sentencing.148
New Jersey’s Law Revision Commission also had some success in cleaning up
some redundant or outdated crimes, conflicting sentencing ranges and poor organization
in its code. The legislature adopted its recommendations to revise awkward crime
definitions; to repeal duplicative crimes on marijuana-growing, on persuading others to
take drugs, and on a range of other provisions; and to decriminalize several offenses that
are “regulatory in nature and can be adequately addresse[d] through civil remedies,”
including trivial offenses such as selling ship tickets without indicating the ship’s country
of origin.149
Note these reforms succeeded even though these state commissions are fairly
weak as framework laws. The legislatures were not restricted to up-or-down votes on the
commission reports but still adopted them in bulk. To be sure, this is not proof that all
legislatures are consistently effective at keeping codes coherent and up-to-date.
Robinson has documented they do not,150 and variations in states’ legislative procedures,
as well as the absence or ineffectiveness of such commissions in many states, would
predict as much.151 But these examples demonstrate a mechanism and capacity for repeal
and reform of criminal provisions that scholars criticize, despite the fact that those
147
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changes are hardly pressing issues on legislative or interest-group agendas nor triggered
by high-profile news events. Commissions help legislatures achieve reform that is less
likely under regular rules and procedures.152 The ratchet of criminal legislation can turn
both ways.
Variations on this model appear elsewhere. Most states have now established
commissions to study and make recommendations on their sentencing policies.153 Some
have already succeeded in prompting sentencing reform such as that described above,154
and a key tool they employ to prompt reform is financial impact analysis of sentence
enhancements that show legislatures the likely cost of incarceration policies.155 Further,
states periodically organize special bodies to review their codes and propose
comprehensive reform, a process that sometimes provides the impetus for wide-ranging
code reform. Illinois and Kentucky both recently created commissions to study and offer
reform strategies for their bloated codes (though neither has yet led to reform).
In addition to framework laws, triggering events can prompt legislatures to act
when they otherwise would not. This is a familiar overcriminalization point: a publicized
crime like a carjacking prompts (often unnecessary) legislation; many states added
terrorism provisions in murder statutes and other parts of their criminal codes after
9/11.156 But triggering events can also prompt criminal law repeal and reform; the best
known example is promulgation of the Model Penal Code. The MPC’s 1962 publication
provided an occasion for several states to comprehensively revise their criminal codes.
That wide-ranging reform, in addition to reducing redundancy and conceptual
incoherence in many codes, included some decriminalization that states might not have
pursued as readily if proposed as discrete repeal bills. The MPC is credited with
152

Cf. Garrett, supra note 138, at 32-33 (“Frameworks can be seen as precommitment devices enacted to
constrain lawmakers and to make certain legislative outcomes more likely” or to “change the dynamics of
bargaining” and “make certain actions more costly in political terms”).
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For a complete list of such commissions, see http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/p/cjl-info.php. For a
discussion of several, see Robin Campbell, Dollars & Sentences: Legislators’ Views on Prisons,
Punishment, and the Budget Crisis 15 (July 2003).
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See supra text at notes 83-93; see, e.g., Alabama Sentencing Commission Achieves Success: Sentencing
Reform Legislation Enacted, at
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/Publications/ASC%20Achieves%20Success%20NASC
%20Article%207-03.doc.; Alabama Sentencing Commission, 2005 Annual Report.
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Barkow, supra note 33, at 800-10 (discussing state commission’s use of financial impact statements).
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See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31(13) & 18.2-46.4 (defining murder during an act of terrorism as a
capital offense and defining terrorism).
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prompting decriminalization of sodomy and other consensual sexual conduct,157 for
example, as well as petty offenses that the MPC categorizes as non-criminal
“violations.”158 Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill advocate a Model Penal Code Second
as the most promising means to prompt states again to comprehensively reform their
criminal laws, arguing an MPC helps solve familiar bases for political resistance to
reform by prosecutors, defenders, judges and legislators.159 Note that this pattern is
familiar in other policy areas, which means also that legislative reluctance for
comprehensive law reform is widespread across subject areas.160
IV. The Breadth of Democratic Governance of Criminal Law
A. Executive branch actors and democratic responsiveness.
If a key measure of overcriminalization is whether its scope and effect accords
with majoritarian preferences, laws-on-the-books do not tell the full story. Democratic
regulation of criminal justice does not end with legislatures. The vast bulk of criminal
law—state criminal law—is administered by prosecutors who are elected by local
constituencies.161 (Federal prosecutors are appointed, and their accountability is more
attenuated.)162 As Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz recently described, state prosecutors’
accountability combines with the salience of crime as a local political issue and
constraints on enforcement budgets to give state prosecutors relatively little practical
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See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (crediting the MPC with prompting decriminalization
of consensual sexual conduct). See also Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 173-77 (stressing MPC’s
influence on state code reform in the 1960s and 1970s and arguing a second MPC could solve roadblocks
to reform).
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See M.P.C. § 1.04 (“A violation does not constitute a crime”); cf. id. at § 2.12 (mandating dismissal for
“de minimus” infractions of crimes).
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See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 8, at 169-77.
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The MPC’s success at prompting state reform was modest compared to the states’ wider adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Forty-six states have adopted all or key
parts of the U.C.C. See http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html. Thirty-eight have substantially
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html.
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See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 734
(1996) (95% of state prosecutors are locally elected) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts 2 (1993)).
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On federal prosecutors as political actors, see James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S.
Attorneys in the Political and Legal Systems (1978). See also William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 861-63 (2001) (describing
differences in political pressures and accountability between state and federal prosecutors).
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discretion on a large portion of their dockets.163 Homicides, robbery, burglary, assault,
auto-theft and some drug crimes are politically mandatory crimes for prosecutors and
police to pursue—as are some lesser crimes, especially drunk driving and, often,
domestic violence164—even if the odds of obtaining a conviction in any given case are
fairly long. That consumes most of police and prosecutors’ time and budgets. State
prosecutors depend on police to provide them with cases; police, busy with violent and
other politically mandatory crimes as well as order-maintenance policing, have little time
for silly, antiquated crimes.165
Historically, patterns in discretionary enforcement vary. Prosecutors mostly
ignored crimes against homosexual sex, fornication or prostitution for decades, then
dramatically stepped up enforcement in many locales for several years. Sodomy
prosecutions jumped in the early twentieth century before declining again.166 Liquor
prosecutions in Virginia jumped in the 1920s to briefly become the most prosecuted
felony.167 The federal Mann Act was aggressively used in the 1910s and 1920s to combat
prostitution and even fornication but was nearly a dead letter by the 1960s;168
prosecutorial campaigns against prostitution and red-light districts rose and declined with
public sentiment and social-movement campaigns.169 Those variations do not refute the
Richman-Stuntz thesis; they demonstrate instead that what crimes are politically
mandatory (or at least politically appealing) to prosecutors vary as public opinion and
interest group pressures shift.
Note those constraints are not solely a product of prosecutors’ accountability.
They are also a function of legislatures’ decisions to limit prosecutors’ budgets. What
legislatures give with one hand—expansive, redundant codes—they restrict with the
163

Richman and Stuntz, supra note 10, at 599-606.
Fla. Stat. § 741.2901 (mandatory prosecution policy).
165
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courts and other dispositional alternatives. John S. Goldkamp et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Community Prosecution Strategies: Measuring Impact 2-7 (Nov. 2002) (NCJ 192826) (listing programs
employed by half of all prosecutors). See also Bureau of Justice Assistance, Defining Drug Courts: The
Key Components (Nov. 2004 NCJ 205621) (describing prosecutors’ nontraditional roles in drug courts).
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Friedman, supra note 37, at 344.
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Id. at 340.
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Id. at 325-28 & 343; see also Anne M. Coughlin, Of White Slaves and Domestic Hostages, 1 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 109 (1997) (comparing arguments that led to Mann Act and the Violence Against Women
Act of 1998).
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Friedman, supra note 37, at 328-29.
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other by limiting prosecutors’ resources, so that they cannot enforce every crime on the
books. Those limits have several effects; one is that they encourage plea bargaining over
trials, which allows processing of more cases within a limited budget. But budget limits
also greatly constrain some effects of code growth, and this is likely legislatures’ intent.
While tight budgets are a function of allocation decisions in light of resource constraints,
restricting agency budgets is also a familiar legislative strategy to limit enforcement—an
observation familiar to administrative law,170 where legislative opposition to enforcement
policy is more common than in criminal law. But legislators (and the public) express
little such opposition to most criminal enforcement both because there is a large realm of
universally accepted enforcement (traditional core crimes) and because resource
constraints, plus accountability, are so effective at keeping prosecutors from doing much
else.
The combination of political accountability and budget constraints give state
prosecutors a small practical range for pursuing prosecutions with little public support.171
That is a key reason why overcriminalization scholarship pays a lot of attention to
statutes on the books and much less to prosecutions under antiquated or trivial statutes.
There is rarely a pattern of prosecutions under such statutes; we have only rare outliers,
such as the sodomy prosecution of John Lawrence in Harris County, Texas.172
Overcriminalization can happen on the books because it is so constrained in practice.
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Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien
Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 191 (“Congress also has any number of formal and informal tools
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The prosecution in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), was equally unusual, even in a state with strict anti-contraception laws. See Comment, supra note
50 (describing pre-Griswold history of prosecutions under anti-contraception statutes). For another
discussion of an adultery prosecution that seems to be an unusual outlier, see Joanna Grossman, Punishing
Adultery in Virginia, Dec. 16, 2003, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20031216.html (discussing
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Democratic accountability also explains the occasional small, local pattern of
enforcing obscure or controversial statutes. In the 1990s an Idaho prosecutor won
convictions of several pregnant teenage girls and their boyfriends for fornication;
punishments were community service and parenting classes.173 The prosecutions (which
didn’t continue long) were a strategy to deter teenage pregnancy and related social
problems;174 most were prosecuted only after applying for public assistance. The
prosecutions drew criticism in national media, but it is likely the local electorate was not
strongly opposed; the prosecutor won re-election a few months after securing the
convictions. The example supports the broader point. Because state criminal law
enforcement is accountable to local constituencies, prosecutions under seemingly
outdated statutes may accord with local majoritarian preferences, and those preferences
may be based on a policy rationale beyond simply moral opposition to fornication. Even
outlier prosecutions, then, might not be properly characterized as examples of overcriminalization. American criminal law is fragmented among 50 states, which fragment
enforcement among localities. We should expect the sort of policy variation and
experimentation that characterizes (and is a virtue of) federalism.175
Federal practice is different and worse. Even there, scholars concede that muchmaligned statutes on carjacking or Smokey Bear’s image are rarely or never enforced.176
But federal prosecutors have much more practical discretion arising from bigger budgets,
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See Heidi Meinzer, Idaho’s Throwback to Elizabethan England: Criminalizing a Civil Proceeding, 34
Fam. L.Q. 165, 165 (2000) (describing the prosecutions); Scott Morris, Idaho Prosecutor: Old Law, New
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less democratic monitoring, and the power they gain from a rigid sentencing regime.177
That discretion is most problematic when it combines with one specific sort of statutory
breadth—expansive fraud and regulatory offenses that define undisputed wrongdoing but
which also capture some marginal or innocuous conduct.178 The problem is worst where
prosecutorial discretion is greatest—the small, unique but prominent (and now formally
defunct) practice of independent counsels, who rigorously pursue marginal wrongdoing
under broad false-statements statutes or the like.179 More common arguable abuses also
arise under broad fraud and regulatory statutes,180 and federal offenses that duplicate state
crimes, such as drug or weapons offenses, can result in disparate sentencing for criminal
conduct.181 Those problems are real and worthy of scholarly and political attention, but
bear in mind their exceptionalism. Much overfederalization is contained within widely
supported offenses (drug trafficking or gun use during crimes)182 rather than marginal
ones, even though the sentencing disparities are troubling. And problematic fraud and
regulatory prosecutions make up a small fraction of federal practice,183 which itself
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Authority, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (2001).
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rather than possession.) See 2003 Sourcebook, supra note 4, at tbl. 5.17.
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supra note 4, at tbl. 5.17. And white-collar crime is the one area scholars have suggested may be undercriminalized. See Beale, supra note 10, at 780 (explaining why overcriminalization is less likely in whitecollar contexts and why we may have “too little white collar crime enforcement”); Richard Lazarus,
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2454 n.218, 2511 & n.448 (1995) (calling
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constitutes perhaps five percent of American criminal law.184 Those problems are hardly
representative of the general scope or effects of overcriminalization.
Enforcement patterns arising from democratically accountable state prosecutors
explain a final point as well. Because most obscure or superfluous statutes in criminal
codes are effectively nullified by prosecutors, legislatures’ incentives to update codes and
repeal antiquated statutes are greatly reduced. If American jurisdictions had mandatory
prosecution policies, coupled with investigatory resources to pursue most violations,
legislatures would likely repeal crimes much more quickly that no longer accord with
majoritarian preferences. (One suspects it wouldn’t take many prosecutions of Girl Scout
troops for misusing Smokey Bear’s image to move Congress to repeal that crime.) But
legislators have little incentive to, because police and prosecutors, taking signals from
local electorates, largely do it for them, and legislatures make sure they do by
constraining enforcement budgets. To be sure, effective repeal by non-enforcement is not
the same as actual repeal. Outdated, poorly conceived, and duplicative statutes, as noted,
can generate doctrinal confusion on mens rea requirements, allow disparate treatment of
similar offenders, and facilitate occasional vindictive prosecutions as well as muddy
criminal law’s expressive and moral force. But the democratic responsiveness of
executive-branch officials nonetheless explains why legislatures are not more vigilant
about keeping criminal codes in accord with popular sentiments.185 They achieve much
of that goal indirectly through prosecutors’ budgets and accountability, rather than
directly by repeal or careful code drafting. Some are explicit about this delegation of
code maintenance to the executive branch. A Washington state statute urges prosecutors
not to enforce “antiquated statutes” that “serve[] no deterrent or protective purpose in
today’s society” and have “not been recently reconsidered by the legislature.”186
B. Courts and democratic responsiveness.

occupational health and safety law under-criminalized and arguing for reform of environmental criminal
law rather than “the extreme result of noncriminalization”).
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See supra note __.
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In the federal context, Dan Richman has described additional tools Congress uses to influence
enforcement, including use of oversight committees, constraints on investigative agencies’ jurisdictions and
budgets, funding prosecutor jobs for specific agendas, and requiring Main Justice approval for some
prosecutions. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757, 791-805 (1999).
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Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.411(1).
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As noted above, many of the Supreme Court decisions that constitutionally barred
crimes or punishments occurred in the wake of state legislative trends repealing such
laws. State supreme courts similarly overturned criminal prohibitions and often
prompted no legislative or popular backlash to reinstate those crimes. Both of those
patterns accord with an increasingly prominent thesis about American courts and
majoritarian preferences. Rather than being counter-majoritarian institutions, American
courts rarely get far ahead of public opinion on controversial issues. Michael Klarman’s
landmark book From Jim Crow to Civil Rights makes this argument in what had
previously seemed the unlikely context of the constitutional law of race relations.187 The
same thesis may explain Lawrence v. Texas: the Court’s ban on sodomy crimes followed
rather than led popular opinion.188 William Nelson offered a similar thesis to explain
New York state courts’ changing interpretation of several morals-related criminal statutes
through middle decades of the twentieth century.189 Nelson described New York courts
as strictly enforcing criminal morals offenses, such as obscenity restrictions on media, in
accord with popular support for such enforcement in the early part of that century. As
public opinion shifted, Nelson detailed shifts in courts’ interpretation of statutes not only
of obscenity offenses and other crimes implicating free speech but even domestic
violence and non-stranger rape crimes, which he characterized as functionally
decriminalized by a range interpretative choices that made those offenses difficult to
enforce. Similarly, even the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions may be
understood as more majoritarian than traditionally thought.190
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Viewed this way, we can understand other trends in courts’ doctrinal construction
of crime and punishment rules as adjustments that track shifts in popular sentiment.
Consider two federal examples. Federal judges had notoriously little discretion under
sentencing guidelines before United States v. Booker.191 But even here, scholars found
patterns of courts using their modest interpretive tools within the guidelines to temper
excessive sentences.192 And in the context of federal regulatory or white-collar crime
prosecutions, federal courts have a clear pattern of interpreting hundreds of criminal
statutes to contain strict mens rea requirements. Those constructions make prosecutions
more difficult by giving defendants an ignorance-of-the-law defense.193 Many of the
statutes courts have restricted in this way are the type of expansive provisions on obscure
or marginal fraud conduct that a common focus of overcriminalization complaints:194
statutes that criminalize un-sworn false statements,195 health and safety violations,196
misapplication of student loan funds,197 unauthorized use of food coupons198 or recorded
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phone conversations,199 and the like. One way to view these interpretive trends by courts
is an effort to reign in excessive federal criminalization, and to decrease the odds that
such statutes will be used to convict defendants whose conduct would widely be viewed
as innocent or insufficiently wrongful to merit criminal punishment.
On this account, courts serve as a third mechanism to moderate criminal law in
accord with changing social views on appropriate criminalization. That is especially
important to explain the one area of substantial decriminalization that legislatures did not
lead: crimes that implicated First Amendment liberties. Crimes that limit free expression
values, from radical political advocacy and civil rights protests to pornography and
artistic or personal expression, are notable categories of activity that were substantially
decriminalized in the twentieth century more by courts than legislatures. Yet three
observations suggest that the Supreme Court was not decriminalizing speech-related
conduct in the face of strong public opposition.
First, there are few indicia that the Court is notably more in conflict with
majoritarian preferences and dominant political opinion on First Amendment topics than
it has been on racial equality issues or elsewhere. The Court has been notably solicitous,
for instance, of legislative and executive actions that restrict speech in times of perceived
crisis, such as the Red scares of the early 1920s and 1950s.200 Second, recent scholarship
on the intellectual history of free speech has described the influence of social movements
(such the Free Speech League founded around 1900) and elite opinion that urged
deregulation of both obscenity and political speech and presaged doctrinal changes
toward those ends.201 Court decisions barring crimes of speech-related conduct generated
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little of the sustained social-movement opposition sparked by decisions on abortion,
school prayer, or even some criminal procedure rulings.202 Finally, popular culture seems
to have largely endorsed many of the speech-related liberties courts evolved in the last
several decades. Risqué clothing, books, periodicals, music, movies, advertising and
other media once banned by obscenity laws meet with considerable success in the
marketplace and provide cultural support for the dramatic contraction of obscenity
regulation.203
Some components of First Amendment liberties likely remain countermajoritarian—decriminalization of flag burning and perhaps of some radical political
speech are examples. Also, given constitutional leeway, we would probably see some
local political communities regulating in all these areas despite a national consensus in
favor of decriminalization. Nonetheless, in the largest area in which courts are
responsible for decriminalization without legislative leadership, it is still plausible to
view this form of decriminalization as an example of courts working within the rough
parameters of democratic preferences. Like prosecutorial decisions not to enforce
statutes, courts that overturn or narrowly interpret criminal laws take pressure off of
legislatures for decriminalization by doing some of the work for them. Courts’
contributions, like those of state prosecutors, seem to do more to keep criminal law’s
substantive reach in rough accord with majoritarian preferences than to depart from those
preferences.
C. The democratic baseline for judging overcriminalization.
The foregoing account responds partially to overcriminalization critiques that
imply criminal law’s growth—and criminal justice’s problems—stem in large part from
the one-way ratchet of legislatures expanding but rarely contracting crimes and
punishment. It addresses as well the less explicit argument that legislatures distort
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majoritarian preferences through construction of criminal law.204 But this does not
answer some overcriminalization criticisms, because many rest on normative claims
about the appropriate scope and use of criminal law. Statutes over-criminalize only
relative some baseline of appropriate criminalization. Many scholars are clear about
normative-baseline claims.205 Erik Luna argues explicitly for a libertarian theory of
criminal law, which would constrain many extant components of contemporary criminal
codes.206 A similar perspective underlies recent overcriminalization reports sponsored by
the Federalist Society, the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation. David A.J.
Richards grounds his human rights critique in an extension of deontological moral theory
that gives priority to autonomy and equal rights for all persons.207 More fundamentally,
the dominant popular and scholarly account of criminal law’s proper scope probably is
the harm principle, a thesis that traces its origins from John Stuart Mill’s essay “On
Liberty”208 through H.L.A. Hart’s defense of the principle (most prominently against the
legal moralism thesis of Lord Devlin)209 to its adoption by Joel Feinberg,210 Herbert
Packer,211 and others.212 The Hart-Devlin debate was a debate about the proper basis and
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scope of criminal law and therefore, at bottom, about the criteria by which
overcriminalization claims should be judged.213
Many of these arguments are (to me) persuasive. American jurisdictions
overcriminalize or overpunish when judged against a range of normative claims grounded
in retributive justice, optimal deterrence or effective crime prevention.214 But these are
arguments about what principles legislatures (and courts) should choose to adopt215 and,
ultimately, what principles democratic majorities should be persuaded by and urge upon
their representatives. Many of those arguments, however sound, have not yet prevailed in
political debates or the marketplace of ideas beyond academia.
Judged instead by how well it tracks majoritarian preferences, criminal law looks
much less like over-criminalization, and legislative processes look less anomalous in their
construction of criminal law. High American incarceration rates reflect a broad cultural
and political consensus for harsh criminal law that legislatures reflect fairly accurately, a
claim at the core of James Whitman’s and David Garland’s recent, excellent (and
divergent) books comparing American and European punishment policies.216 It is
probably an insurmountable task to aggregate public preferences accurately on a broad
topic like criminal justice and then assess how well political outcomes reflect those
preferences.217 But there is little evidence that American legislatures, prosecutors and
courts depart substantially and consistently—as opposed to occasionally in specific
cases—from those preferences, nor that they do more so with regard to criminal law than
other broad social policy topics.
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That, in turn, helps explain consistent public support for criminal law. Majorities
are not always reliable protectors of minorities’ interests, and thus we have no political
solution in sight, for instance, on excessive incarceration of African American men
(though note modest progress on racial profiling).218 But if criminal law frequently
reached conduct that majorities care about, public support for criminal law would shift
quickly. Imagine a world with regular prosecutions for sex or cohabitation between
unmarried people, for Sunday retail sales, for wearing bikinis in public or possessing racy
novels, for criticizing public officials on cable news channels, for defaulting on debt or
refusing employment—all things we once criminalized, or nearly so, and that are still
sometimes punished in other (mostly non-democratic) nations. Even present-day cases of
marginal federal fraud and false statement offenses would generate opposition if
widespread enough to draw public attention (as independent counsel Ken Starr learned).
Deviations from broad public preferences are agency costs; principals can’t monitor and
control every detail of agents’ actions. But the broad sweep of criminal law aligns, and
adjusts over time, roughly with public preferences. It just happens that, to the dismay of
many (including me), those preferences support exceedingly harsh sanctions for many
crimes and use of criminal law for social problems on which other policy tools could be
effective.
D. The coherence of democratic preferences on criminal law.
Even if American law is not overcriminalized by a plausible measure of
democratic preferences, scholars criticize codes not only for failing to embody a
particular normative vision, but for manifesting incoherence or irrationality by, for
instance, criminalizing innocuous conduct, excessively punishing conduct that creates
attenuated risks of harm, or punishing similar conduct (e.g., possession of crack and
powder cocaine), or even the same conduct, differently under various statutes.
Many of these criticisms track those made against regulation more generally.
Agencies value human lives very differently in different contexts, and precautions against
risk reduction don’t consistently match objective estimates of the likelihood of risks.219
218
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These regulatory defects reflect much-discussed defects in human cognition: people
exaggerate vivid, easily understood or recently publicized risks, for instance. But those
regulatory criticisms are themselves highly contested, and recent work reassessing
regulatory critiques suggests a means also to challenge at least portions of the depictions
of criminal codes as incoherent and irrational.
Consider how emerging research on “cultural cognition” and its role in
democratic decision-making might generate a more defensible description of recent
trends in criminal code coverage. Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic and their colleagues have
developed accounts of “cultural worldviews” that categorize people’s perspective along
axes of individualism-solidarism and hierarchy-egalitarianism. Briefly, “hierarchists
morally disapprove of behavior that defies conventional norms and thus naturally believe
that deviant behavior is dangerous; egalitarians morally disapprove of norms that rigidly
stratify people, and individualists disapprove of norms that constrain individual choice
generally, so these types naturally believe that deviant behavior is benign” but favor
markets and private orderings.220 These worldview descriptors help explain conflicting
perspectives on risks and social policies addressing risks. Worldviews affect how people
assess risks, and even what evidence of risks they are willing to credit. Perceptions of
activities’ costs and benefits are filtered through cultural perceptions of the activities’
social meaning and moral import.221 Risk perceptions express, because they are
dependent upon, cultural worldviews.
With these tools, we can see a path toward an account of some of criminal law’s
contentious components as well as recent trends of its expansion and contraction. For
consensual sex crimes, individualist and egalitarian norms are now trumping formerly
dominant hierarchical ones; the latter see greater risks in promiscuous sex.222 That is an
emerging (much more modest) trend on nonviolent drug possession crimes as well, but
hierarchists, who worry more about the harms of individual drug use, are still a dominant
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force in drug policy.223 Kahan and his colleagues have studied gun policy and find
egalitarian and solidaristic people disfavor widespread private gun ownership on the view
that it harms public safety; hierarchists and individualists fear gun restrictions because
limiting private tools of defense diminishes public safety. In these ways, cultural views
affect how likely we perceive risks from such policy choices to be, and they these policy
views in turn express specific, cultural visions of the good society and the virtuous life.224
This cultural-evaluator approach provides a means for Kahan and his colleagues
to respond to critiques that describe public preferences on regulatory issues as irrational
by explaining the coherence of policy choices that depart from those implied by actuarial
or other expert analysis of risk. These tools likewise suggest ways to respond to some
criticisms of criminal codes as irrational.
I will not attempt here a full-scale theory of criminal codes’ coherence in light of
recent patterns of offense expansion and repeal, but note some possibilities for that
project. The expansive federal law on fraud and false statements may be appealing to
hierarchists, who may view even modest examples of such conduct as deviant challenges
to legitimate institutional arrangements, while individualists may not view such conduct
as benign acts entitled to freedom from sanction. Change in alcohol policies might be
coherent in these terms as well. As we liberalize alcohol access and as driving increases,
we aim to reduce increasing risks from deviant misuses of these activities by harshly
punishing drunk driving and restricting teen drinking.225 Widespread trends of
decriminalizing consensual sex and gun possession likewise suggest a rise of
individualist values. But jurisdictions have also widely adopted increased penalties for
illicit weapons use: penalties increase for gun usage in crimes, felons are widely barred
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from owning guns, and violent crime sentences remain high.226 Those combinations of
policies likely map out coherently in cultural cognition terms; they may imply a
individualist-dominated approach to private liberties backed by a hierarchists’ concern
about deviant, order-threatening abuse of those liberties in the form of vivid risks such as
armed criminals (or drunk drivers or sexual predators). Gambling fits the same story:
more freedom from criminal and civil regulation for consensual transactions, but officials
regulate abuses through criminal fraud227 and money laundering228 laws and prosecution
of organized crime as well as with related regulatory schemes. The decriminalization of
much public profanity, of revealing or unconventional dress, and bans on unmarried
cohabitation likely marks a coalition of individualistic and egalitarian worldviews.229
These speculations are preliminary to be sure. And we should not expect to be able
explain a broad collection of laws perfectly as according perfectly public preferences
even if these cultural types are accurate accounts of those preferences. There may be no
clear majority preference on a given issue but rather cycling pluralities on multiple
options.230 And public preferences do not translate directly into legislation; they are
mediated by legislative and other democratic processes, which open avenues for minority
preferences to prevail, or for policy options to be presented and debated in ways that shift
preferences. Nonetheless, contemporary criminal law may well fit a coherent account
built with the conceptual tools of insights such as cultural cognition, even as it fails by
scholars’ normative standards of the harm principle, libertarianism, or a vision of rational
sanction according to objective measures of risks and harms. And by such an account,
many features of criminal law may look less like overcriminalization.
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V. Overcriminalization and Criminal Justice’s Biggest Problems
Despite the constraint of democratic preferences, the facts remain that over the
last several decades criminal codes’ overall growth outstripped their contraction.231 At
the same time, incarceration rates have risen dramatically, and a range of much-discussed
problems worsened, including excessive plea bargaining and incarceration, racial
disparities, and small but significant problem of wrongful convictions. If
overcriminalization criticisms are really complaints about how we make and maintain
criminal law—or put differently, about democratic governance of criminal law—then
how much blame does the growth of criminal law share for this state of affairs?
Relatively little. Consider three prominent sets of problems.
A. Incarceration rates
There is a wide scholarly consensus that American incarceration rates are
excessive and racially skewed and that sentencing policies are overly rigid.232 Expansion
of substantive criminal law deserves little blame for this. The dramatic growth in
incarceration rates is mostly of a function of new sentencing laws rather than new crimes,
coupled with greater enforcement of mostly long-standing, familiar crimes, not outdated
ones with little popular support.
Data on state felony convictions suggest that convictions focus overwhelmingly
on traditional crimes about which there is little criminalization debate. In 2002, there
were just over one million conviction felony convictions in state courts. Eight-five
percent of those were for traditional crimes of violence (murder, sexual assault, robbery
and aggravated assault), property (burglary, car theft and other larceny or fraud offenses)
or drugs. The remaining fifteen percent mostly included uncontroversial nonviolent
crimes such as receiving stolen property or vandalism.233
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To be sure, these broad categories obscure some risks of overcriminalization.
They lump together multiple definitions of theft, arson and other crimes that might cause
the sorts of effects that scholars worry about, such as disparate sanctions for comparable
offenders or excessively light proof burdens for prosecutors.234 Nonetheless, the data
strongly suggest that pursuit of obscure, marginal or controversial crimes is a statistically
negligible problem, at least at the felony level. Occasional, outlier crimes—felony
punishment for breaches of private fiduciary duties or of false statements under oath—are
still legitimate causes for scholarly concern, but they are not substantial systemic
problems, and they are concentrated in the federal system.235
Thus, note this misleading correlation: we have an increase in the number of
crimes and a corresponding increase in incarceration. But virtually none of the
incarceration increase of the last 25 years comes from the new substantive crimes added
during that period; it comes from new punishment policies.236 The incarceration increase
comes almost entirely because we’ve decided to punish longstanding crimes more
harshly; punishment for newly created crimes seems to add a statistically insignificant
increment to incarceration rates. And Bernard Harcourt’s current work suggests that
even recent incarceration rate increases are not over-incarceration, relative to rates in the
first half of the twentieth century, if we aggregate prison and mental hospital
confinement. That combined measure of confinement was highest in the mid-twentieth
century; current prison incarceration increases only substitute criminal confinement for
the dramatic drop in institutionalization of the mentally ill, so that recent combined
confinement measures merely match those of a half-century ago.237 Harcourt’s data
234
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implies that recent punishment increases, in context, do not demonstrate an
unprecedented “over” incarceration shift.
B. Selective prosecution and racial disparities.
Selective prosecution and racial disparities are also prominent, persistent
problems, but here as well the increasing breadth of substantive law is a minimal factor.
The causes of racial disparities are many. One of the most significant is likely
differences in ease and cost of investigation between, for example, street-based drug
markets and trade that occurs more privately in homes and offices.238 Others may be
racial profiling, bias in prosecutorial discretion, and (for the small percentage of cases
that go to juries and for which the evidence is close) jury bias.239 Duplicate crime
definitions have little or no effect on racial profiling, but profiling is facilitated by
expansive codes—especially traffic codes, which give police grounds to stop most people
(and thus anyone they choose) for minor infractions who are then investigated for major
ones.
But most of these disparities arise under offenses that are not plausible candidates
for abolition and thus do not arise from overcriminalization. Save for some petty traffic
offenses—which, despite some movement toward decriminalization, remain the segment
of state codes best described as overcriminalized—the list of crimes that facilitate this
discretion and that we would be willing to decriminalize is probably minimal.
Discretion, and bias in its use, is an inevitable risk under any statute. Selective
enforcement and disparities in outcomes occur even under crimes for which there is
universal support—although one wonders if sentencing for those crimes would find more
public disapproval if enforcement were more evenly distributed across race and class. No
one urges decriminalization of murder (though some oppose the death penalty for it), yet
some of the strongest evidence of racial bias is arises from capital murder prosecutions.240
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Few oppose criminalizing cocaine distribution (though, again, many urge punishment
reform), yet some of the most compelling data on racial disparities arise from
enforcement of this prohibition. Here again, a prominent part of this disparity problem is
federal law. Broad statutes (such as fraud offenses) and wide prosecutorial discretion
raise the odds of selective enforcement.241 And federalization of conduct already covered
by state offenses increases the odds of disparate sentencing outcomes, because federal
penalties far exceed most state ones.242 On this point the critical scholarly consensus
seems sound. But in the overall problem of racially disparate prosecution and sentencing
patterns, overcriminalization in state codes seems to play a small part.
C. Wrongful convictions and plea bargaining.
A final pair of prominent issues is wrongful convictions and increasingly high
rates of plea bargaining along with correspondingly shrinking numbers of trials.
Overcriminalization seems to have no relation to the first, save to the extent it does to the
second. That is, the only factor scholars and advocates point to as a cause of wrongful
convictions that might implicate overcriminalization is prosecutorial power to coerce
risk-averse, innocent defendants into guilty pleas.243
Expansive codes contain more offenses with varying penalties that prosecutors
can leverage in bargaining. Plea to crime X with a five-year sentence, or face trial on
crimes X, Y, and Z with a much higher minimum sentence if you lose.244 This argument
has some merit, but probably less than first appears. A range of other factors drive plea
bargaining and would likely push it to its current levels even if codes contained less
substantive redundancy and criminalization of marginal conduct. Drastic plea
discounts—the difference between sentences after pleas and those after trial—do more to
increase prosecutorial bargaining power than a wide array of substantive statutes,
241

See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 10 (discussing federal prosecutors’ lesser political accountability,
greater budgets and consequent wider discretion).
242
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
243
See Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php (noting serology, hair
analysis and other forms of forensic analysis with high error rates were bases of significant numbers of
wrongful convictions later uncovered with DNA evidence); Report of the Governor’s Commission on
Capital Punishment (April 2002) (report to Illinois Governor available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/).
On the risks of bargains inducing pleas from innocents, see Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains,
27 Cardozo L. Rev. __ (2006). For an innovative, insightful analysis in federal courts, see Wright, supra
note 29 (linking inaccurate case outcomes to prosecutorial power in plea bargaining).
244
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise
of Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harvard Law School Research Paper No. 120).

54

especially those that plausibly could be abolished.245 The force of prosecutorial plea
offers depends on the ability to obtain harsher sentences after trial.246 Caseload increases
on prosecutors, defenders and judges without corresponding increases in resources
encourage all those players to favor bargains over trial.247 (Ron Wright, however, in an
insightful analysis of federal cases, finds pleas increase as prosecutorial resources
increase.)248 Expansive criminal codes may play a role; they increase prosecutors’ ability
to stack multiple charges on the same course of conduct and thereby have more to
bargain with. But in the routine run of cases, many of those charges do not arise from
offense definitions that even most scholars (let alone legislators or voters) would find
easy candidates for repeal; recall that most felons, especially in state systems, serve
sentences for familiar violent, drug and property crimes.249
Moreover, our best historical account of plea bargain practice makes little
mention of expanding substantive codes as an explanation for bargaining’s rise. George
Fisher’s definitive study found plea bargaining grew from an almost non-existent practice
to a dominant one over the nineteenth century largely due to rigid sentencing laws, not
broad codes. Mandatory sentences eliminate judicial discretion and allow prosecutors to
control the discount for pleas over trials and thus bargaining first emerged in liquor cases,
where sentences were determinate.250 Other changes supported bargaining’s growth—
caseload pressures on judges and prosecutors, and changing evidence rules that made trial
(and trial testimony) more risky for defendants.251 But plea bargaining arose before
codes started their expansive growth. While more crimes add to prosecutors’ chargestacking options, it is the sentencing implications of those charges—whether they carry
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mandatory penalties, and whether sentences on separate charges will merge run
concurrently—that make charge-stacking and bargaining a powerful force.
Again, the federal system is more suspect than the states. Even post Booker,252
federal sentences remain more rigid than states’ (mandatory-minimum statutes are
unaffected by Booker), and the case for abolishing overbroad and redundant serious
offenses is stronger there. Even so, Wright’s detailed empirical analysis attributes to the
expansive federal code no such effect.253 Moreover, the point remains for the vast bulk
of criminal law, which occurs in state systems. Leaner, more coherent substantive codes
would likely have only modest effects prosecutorial bargaining power and practice; other
factors would still drive much plea bargaining.
VI. Conclusion
There is no doubt that many state codes are overstuffed with redundant, outdated
and trivial offenses, and the federal code surpasses the worse state offender. But that
does not mean the story of democratic construction of substantive criminal law is as bleak
as many scholars suggest, nor are bloated codes’ effects as significant. Little conduct is
criminalized, and even less is enforced, that majorities think is wholly innocent. And
when majority preferences change about conduct that is criminalized, legislatures often
find their way to repealing such provisions. When a minority of them does not, courts
sometimes do it for them, and prosecutors mostly make sure law-in-action matches those
preferences even if law-on-the-books does not. States vary in their capacity to reform
their codes, but the glass is plausibly viewed as at least half full. There are plenty of
examples of states improving that capacity, especially through the design of legislative
processes—framework laws and use of expert commissions—that point the way for more
states to more effectively manage and monitor criminal law.
Legislatures’ work on criminal law seems little worse than other perennial topics
in which legislative products are open to criticism as wasteful, serving minority interests
at the expense of common ones, or violating a normative ideal. Think of parochial pork252
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barrel items in federal appropriations bills or specialized tax provisions that gradually
clutter the tax code in the wake of its periodic reform. Democratic lawmaking is messy
and rarely accords with a single, coherent theory of how any policy—the tax code or
criminal code, say—should be organized. But Congress occasionally finds ways to
improve these imperfect processes—framework laws are good examples—and a
significant number of states are finding comparable ways to do so with regard to criminal
lawmaking. And if those sorts of procedural reforms improve legislative management of
criminal law, then remaining problems are not so much criminal law politics and
democracy generally but in significant part choices among particular, sub-constitutional
mechanisms of political process, which are clearly amenable to reform.
The full details of criminal law defy description within a coherent normative
theory, but holding aside pockets of federal practice and some unenforced, mostly minor
state laws, its broad sweep roughly accords with majoritarian preferences. If this is true,
criminal law’s substantive reach is not likely to undermine its public legitimacy;
majorities seem to have little problem with many provisions scholars complain about.
Other effects of criminal law’s haphazard growth—inconsistent terminology, publication
of offenses outside the criminal code, varying punishments for similar crimes—are
continuing issues. But they are largely separate from the core concern of
overcriminalization, namely that criminal law punishes conduct most people think is
innocent, and that law’s substantive scope excessively enhances prosecutorial power.
Criminal law, in short, is not as substantively broad—especially in its practical
reach—as overcriminalization literature typically implies. Nor are democratic processes
as deeply and distinctively flawed on the construction of criminal law. Legislatures have
an undervalued history for reforming crime definitions, prosecutors constrain those
offenses even more in practice, and procedural innovations show the possibility, and
perhaps the promise, for improving legislative governance of criminal law.
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